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 1 
Legality, ethnicity and violence in Austrian Galicia, 1890-1920 
Christoph Mick, University of Warwick 
 Retrospectively everything seems straightforward. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century the time of the big land empires was running out. At the 
periphery empires were under threat from national and anti-colonial 
movements, in the centre empires were under pressure from nationalism and 
revolutionary socialism. The empires’ minorities felt oppressed and exploited 
while nationalists in the centre believed that the dominant nation was being held 
back by the inherent conservatism of imperial governments. From outside, 
empires were being challenged by nation states, a new form of political 
organisation offering an alternative to empires and the remnants of feudalism.1 
In the view of nationalist historians, empires were a thing of the past. After the 
war, they created inherently teleological narratives, whereby the independent 
nation state represented the logical and necessary outcome of the nation’s self-
realisation. Accepting autonomy within an imperial framework did not fit in well 
with the average national narrative and – if it was discussed at all – was treated 
as an aberration from the ‘rightful path’ of national history.2 
However, in 1914 empires were still very much alive. They had responded to the 
nationalist challenge by reforming and modernising. Aware of the growing 
strength of national movements and the dynamism of nation states and 
challenged by the nationalism of the dominant nation, imperial governments 
responded in different ways. Policies fluctuated between attempts to suppress 
national movements, sometimes – as in Russia’s Ukrainian provinces – 
underpinned by efforts to homogenise the population, and concessions aimed at 
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placating the respective ethnicities.3 Loyalty to the empire and nationalism were 
not mutually exclusive. Before the Great War, many national movements were 
not demanding independence but campaigned for an autonomous ‘national 
territory’ and self-administration within existing imperial borders. Austria-
Hungary in particular had developed a culture of compromise and created a legal 
framework, which managed to contain ethnic conflicts by providing, at least in 
the Austrian half, a space where national movements could develop.  
The case of the crownland known as the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, 
discussed in this essay, confirms the positive evaluation of Austrian-Hungarian 
nationality policy put forward by Gary B. Cohen, John Deak, Pieter Judson and 
others.4 Austria-Hungary not only compares favourably with other empires, but 
also with some of its successor states. After the disintegration of Austria-
Hungary, ethnic conflicts in the region intensified and became more brutal. The 
essay will show (1) that in Galicia in 1914 the imperial framework was widely 
accepted by all ethnic groups, as it offered them legal protection while allowing 
each group to pursue their specific interests peacefully; (2) that war and military 
rule undermined the legal order and weakened the procedures which had 
previously been used to resolve ethnic conflicts peacefully;5 (3) that changes to 
the international context, the proclamation of the right of national self-
determination by the new Soviet Russian government and by U.S. President 
Woodrow Wilson dramatically reduced the attraction of the imperial framework 
for the Polish and other national movements and significantly contributed to the 
dissolution of Austria-Hungary; (4) that the acceptance of the rules of peaceful 
conflict resolution by the Ukrainian and Polish national movements depended on 
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the imperial framework and that therefore (contrary to Judson’s view)6 the 
collapse of Austria-Hungary marked a radical break with the past, despite the 
continuity of imperial institutions, practices and legal systems in the new Polish 
state.  
A few words on the terminology used in this essay: ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic group’ 
refer to a cultural community which shares the myth of a common origin and a 
set of historical memories and whose members stand apart from their 
environment through the sharing of one or more cultural traits such as language, 
customs and religion.7 The term ‘ethnic group’ entails the possibility that the 
main, but not the only, marker of difference can be denomination or religion. 
Following Anthony D. Smith, I use the term ‘nation’ to denote a named 
community with a history and culture, living on a connected territory, with a 
common economy, a system of mass education, and equality before the law or – 
and this goes further than Smith’s concept – an ethnic group with a national 
mass movement which aims to create an independent nation state or achieve 
national autonomy within an existing state. This modified definition of what 
constitutes a nation takes the specific conditions in Eastern Europe in the 19th 
and 20th centuries into account, when nationalists from certain ethnic groups 
succeeded in forming national mass movements without controlling a state.8 
This does not overlook the fact that a considerable number of people were 
nationally indifferent and did not identify with any nation.9 
 
Nationalism and anti-Semitism contained: Galicia before the Great War 
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The Austrian-Hungarian compromise of 1867 was also the start of a new phase 
in the history of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria. As a result of the 
compromise the Austrian Empire was divided into two parts, with the small river 
Leitha constituting the border between the two. The two halves had different 
governments and different parliaments but were united in the person of the 
Emperor of Austria, who was also King of Hungary, and shared three kaiserliche 
und königliche (k. u. k., imperial and royal) ministers (who covered foreign 
affairs, military matters and part of finances). The Hungarian government 
pursued a nationality policy which focused on strengthening its grip on the 
ethnically diverse lands of the ‘crown of Stephen’. Their policies favoured 
Hungarians and the hungarised members of other minorities but discriminated 
against ethnic groups who refused to assimilate.10 In the Austrian part, known as 
Cisleithania, the nationality policy focused less on strengthening the ‘German 
element’ and more on keeping the empire together and defending its status as a 
great power. The Austrian government federalised Cisleithania and transferred 
prerogatives to non-German elites in the crownlands. This limited and controlled 
federalisation was accompanied by political liberalisation and democratisation.11  
This approach was also used in the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, which lay 
in the Austrian half. The crownland had a complex ethnic structure, with Poles 
having a slight numerical advantage; in 1910, 46.5% of the roughly eight million 
inhabitants were Roman Catholics (most of whom identified as Poles), as 
opposed to 42.1% Greek Catholics (most of whom considered themselves as 
Ruthenians/Ukrainians12). Jews made up 10.9% of the population. Poles and 
Ruthenians, however, were not evenly distributed across West and East Galicia. 
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Roman Catholics constituted 88.6% of the population in the western part, with 
only 3.2% registered as Greek Catholic. In the Eastern part, Greek Catholics 
comprised 61.7% of the population and Roman Catholics a mere 25.3%. The 
percentage of Jews in East Galicia was higher than in West Galicia (12.4% 
compared to 7.9%).13 The overwhelming majority of Poles and Ukrainians were 
peasants, while the nobility was Polish or polonised. In most towns and cities, 
including those in East Galicia, Poles and Jews were in the majority. 
Ethnicity, language, class, religion, and national identification were positively 
correlated but not conterminous. There were Roman Catholic peasants whose 
daily language was Ukrainian; their ethnicity was contested between Polish and 
Ukrainian nationalists and their national identification was anybody’s guess. 
Many did not identify with any nation but only with their social status (peasant) 
or with their region or religion/denomination. Intermarriages between Roman 
Catholics and Greek Catholics were common, which further blurred the 
boundaries between ethnic groups. As these examples show, denomination or 
religion were important but were not the only factors deciding an individual’s 
national self-identification or the group to which the state or society assigned an 
individual.14 The Jewish population was equally diverse, with some members of 
the economic and cultural elite identifying as ardent Polish patriots while others 
joined the Jewish national movement and supported Zionism or became 
socialists. The majority of Jews, however, did not join any national or other 
political project, were deeply loyal to the emperor, and clung to the religious and 
cultural traditions of Eastern European Jewry.15 While national indifference 
continued to exist, the two decades before the First World War saw a 
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nationalisation of ethnic, religious and social differences. The Polish, Ukrainian 
and Jewish national movements made rapid progress. The evidence for this is the 
dissolution of All-Galician institutions and parties, the emergence of parties, co-
operatives, clubs and institutions organised along ethnic lines, and the success of 
such parties in elections.16 
The government relied on its alliance with Polish noblemen and notables. While 
the crownland had not been given the same status as Hungary, important 
prerogatives, especially with regard to culture and education, were transferred 
to the Diet in Lemberg/Lwów/L’viv,17 and municipal self-government was 
introduced. The governor was appointed by the emperor and was directly 
responsible to him. Until 1914, the governor and the Minister for Galicia were 
always chosen from among the Polish elite, who also held the majority in the Diet 
and in the councils of the two major cities, Lemberg and Cracow. The Polish Club 
(faction) in the House of Deputies in Vienna usually backed the government, and 
the office of prime minister (Ministerpräsident) of the Austrian part of the Dual 
Monarchy was twice held by a member of the Polish nobility.18 The imperial 
reforms had given the Polish elites the opportunity to polonise the crownland. 
Exploiting their control of the institutions of the crownland, new Polish primary 
and secondary schools were established. Polish replaced German as the main 
language of teaching at Lemberg University and became the main internal 
administrative language of the crownland. German retained a role, as it was 
required for communications with Vienna. While on paper Ruthenian/Ukrainian 
was the second official language of the crownland, it suffered in the 1870s and 
1880s as a result of polonisation, after which the status of the Ukrainian 
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language gradually improved again, mirroring the increasing strength of the 
Ukrainophile movement led by members of a growing secular Ukrainian 
intelligentsia.19 This movement considered Ukrainian speakers in Russia and 
Austria-Hungary to be part of a single Ukrainian nation and, from the 1890s, 
increasingly used the ethnonym ‘Ukrainian’ rather than ‘Ruthenian’.20 
The Austrian government tried to de-escalate Polish-Ruthenian tensions and 
strengthen the loyalty to Austria-Hungary, also as an attempt to counter 
Russophile tendencies. In 1890, Governor Kazimierz Badeni, a member of the 
Polish elite but acting on behalf of the Austrian government, negotiated a 
settlement with Julijan Romanchuk, the leader of the Ruthenian Club in the Diet. 
The equality of Ruthenians with Poles was theoretically established, and some 
new Ukrainian-language primary and (more importantly) secondary schools 
were established.21 These concessions did not satisfy the more radical members 
of the Ukrainian national movement, and tensions increased again after 1894. In 
the crownland there was poverty, corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, 
democratic deficits and a class system which favoured the Polish nobility and 
patrician classes. Gendarmes and local authorities often served the interests of 
the big (usually Polish) landowners, but their power was gradually being eroded. 
The increase in liberalisation and democratisation and the level of federalisation 
in Cisleithania gave Galicia a flexible political framework which allowed all 
ethnic and most political groups to pursue their particular interests by peaceful 
and legal means. The political leaders of Galicia’s different national movements 
negotiated with each other and lobbied on behalf of their particular interests at 
the centre, in Vienna. Liberalisation also led to the publication of numerous 
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newspapers and journals in several languages, a flourishing cooperative 
movement, and the emergence of modern political parties.22 After the collapse of 
the compromise negotiated between Badeni and Romanchuk, the Ukrainian 
movement managed to obtain concessions by negotiating and lobbying for 
electoral reforms, for the creation of Ukrainian-language primary and secondary 
schools, and for a Ukrainian university in Lemberg.23  
The decade before the war also saw Polish and Ukrainian nationalists making 
serious progress in winning over the peasants to their respective national 
projects. More and more people joined explicitly nationalist organisations and 
clubs. The journal Ukrainische Rundschau (previously Ruthenische Revue), 
published in German in Vienna and addressing an empire-wide audience, stated 
in 1908: ‘We wish for the continuance (Bestand) and the might of Austria – in our 
own national interest… We are friends of this state (Staatswesen)…, but with a 
principal caveat: that this should be a home (Heimstätte) for us and not an 
emergency shelter’.24 This shows that Ruthenian allegiance to the empire was no 
longer the ‘blind’ loyalism of ‘Tyrolians of the East’ but conditional on the empire 
providing a space for Ukrainian national development. 
What made the nascent Polish-Ukrainian conflict so difficult to resolve was that 
nationalists on both sides claimed some of the same lands as their national 
space.25 Over the long term, the Polish national movement aimed to achieve 
independent statehood and unification with the partitions still under Russian 
and Prussian rule. The opportunities offered by a Polish space in Galicia looked 
very attractive compared to what was happening to Polish cultural and political 
institutions in the Russian Empire and the discrimination directed against Poles 
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in the German Empire. In 1914, the Polish population in Galicia was loyal to the 
Habsburg emperor, but it was clear that independence would be back on the 
agenda, should the opportunity arise.26 For the time being, the Polish Club in 
parliament pressured the government to grant more autonomy to Galicia, while 
the Ukrainian deputies opposed a more far-ranging autonomy, as long as the 
crownland was dominated by a Polish elite, and demanded the partition of the 
crownland into a Polish and a Ukrainian part, with the eastern part (East Galicia) 
run by Ukrainians.27 The Austrian government was evasive. It was well aware 
that such a partition would alienate the Polish elites on whose loyalty Austrian 
rule in Galicia depended.  
Violent clashes still occurred in those years, but such conflicts were usually 
confined to the weeks around election campaigns, when emotions ran high and 
the Polish establishment used all means at its disposal to block the rise of the 
Ukrainophile movement. The loyalty of the Ruthenian population to Austria-
Hungary was tested in the regional and national elections of 1895 and 1897, 
when the police suppressed riots by Ruthenian peasants who were protesting 
against irregularities. Ten peasants were bayonetted to death, thirty were 
severely injured, and several hundreds were arrested. Nevertheless, the political 
and cultural conditions of the Ruthenian population continued to improve, even 
though equality was still far off. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in the 
teeth of opposition by the Polish club in parliament, the imperial authorities 
redrew the boundaries of constituencies, which raised the electoral chances of 
Ruthenian candidates, although the system still grossly disadvantaged the rural 
population (in East Galicia: the Ruthenian/Ukrainians).28 Several other reforms 
 10 
led to an increase in the number of people who had the right to vote in 
parliamentary elections. Universal and equal male suffrage above the age of 
twenty-four for the elections to the House of Deputies in Vienna was finally 
introduced in 1907, in stark contrast to the Diet in Lemberg which, in 1914, was 
still elected in curiae, favouring landowners and the wealthy (usually Polish) 
part of society.29 The 1907 general elections saw a political cooperation between 
Zionists and Ukrainophiles, which helped both groups to increase the numbers of 
their deputies, but the elections were also accompanied by numerous incidents 
of violence, intimidation and fraud. The Polish-dominated local authorities and 
notables enlisted the help of the police to prevent votes from being counted. 
Some names were unlawfully removed from the register of voters, other would-
be voters faced difficulties when trying to register. One example where such 
manoeuvring took place was Rohatyn, where Zionists and Ukrainophiles 
cooperated but were defeated by a controversial Polish national-democratic 
candidate.30  
During the elections to the Galician Diet in February 1908, the local authorities 
again used violence against peasants who were protesting the irregularities and 
manipulations of results, leading to the death of one peasant during the clashes. 
At the same time, Governor Andrzej Potocki used the Russophile party to reduce 
the electoral chances of Ukrainian parties. There was a clear tension between his 
role as a representative of the empire and his identification with the Polish 
national cause as defined by Polish national democrats and the arch-
conservative Podolian nobility. It was not in the interests of the empire to 
support Russophile tendencies, but it gave Polish establishment candidates an 
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advantage in elections. Potocki’s aim was to split the Ruthenian vote and reduce 
the number of Ukrainophile deputies. The violence against peasants and the 
governor’s actions prompted the Ukrainian student Myroslav Sichyns’kyj to 
assassinate Count Potocki. The murder was preceded by violent clashes between 
Polish and Ukrainian students as Ukrainian students tried to reverse the 
polonisation of Lemberg university. Many Ukrainian politicians defended the 
murder of the governor, and Sichyns’kyj became a hero of the Ukrainian student 
movement.31 The assassination of Potocki and the death of the Ukrainian peasant 
in the 1908 election were, however, the exception. In the ten years before the 
outbreak of the First World War, the only other direct fatal casualty of the Polish-
Ukrainian conflict was a Ukrainian student, Adam Kotsko, who was stabbed to 
death during a clash between Polish and Ukrainian students in Lemberg in 
1910.32  
The reasons for such violent clashes were complex and not merely the result of 
nationalist Ukrainian-Polish conflicts and growing anti-Semitism.33 Political 
violence in the region had its roots in a mix of social, political and ethnic 
conflicts. The bloodiest event exemplifying this occurred during the general 
elections in 1911 in Drohobych, a town ruled by an alliance of conservative 
Jewish and Polish notables. The local authorities supported the incumbent 
Nathan Löwenstein, a supporter of Jewish assimilation to the Polish nation. The 
Ukrainophiles supported the Zionist challenger. When the local authorities tried 
to prevent supporters of the Zionist candidate from casting their vote, a mixed 
Jewish and Ruthenian crowd tried to gain access to the ballot office by force. The 
authorities called for military support, which led to the deaths of 25 Jews and 
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Ruthenians. The events shocked Austria. An investigation was carried out, 
newspapers reported on the incident, and it was discussed in parliament.34 In 
this case a Jewish and Polish elite controlled the local authorities and exploited 
their position to use k. u. k soldiers to fight a mixed Ukrainian-Jewish crowd.  
The new governor Michał Bobrzyński, a conservative historian from Cracow, had 
a different understanding of Polish national interests than his predecessor. He 
tried to de-escalate Ukrainian-Polish tensions. He believed that it was not only in 
the imperial interest but also in the Polish national interest to find a compromise 
with the Ukrainophile movement. In 1913, Bobrzyński reached an agreement 
with Ukrainian representatives which would have led to the creation of a 
Ukrainian university within the space of ten years, more Ukrainian schools, more 
Ukrainian deputies in the Diet, and material support for Ukrainian education 
societies. The compromise was supported by Vienna. However, the agreement 
was never enacted, as parts of the Polish elite, including some influential Roman-
Catholic bishops, protested against the – in their view – attack on the Polish 
‘state of possessions’. On January 5th, 1913, Polish notables in Lemberg, worried 
about the agreement, held a closed meeting in the Town Hall with about 2,000 
invited participants. The police noted that young people and women were 
strongly represented in the audience. Several hundred people, unable to find 
room inside, waited outside in the courtyard. A resolution was passed, protesting 
against the founding of a Ukrainian university and promising to fight all attempts 
to curtail the Polish character of the university. After the meeting, around 3,000 
people marched to the university where two speakers then expressed their 
gratitude to the University Senate for its rejection of the proposal. After that, 
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most people went home.35 Bobrzyński had not succeeded in persuading his 
compatriots that it was in the Polish national interest and worth their while to 
make significant concessions to the Ukrainian side in order to decrease Polish-
Ukrainian tensions. Bobrzyński did have the support of the imperial centre; he 
managed to win a majority in the Diet and could have pushed ahead with the 
reforms, but he resigned as he had lost the backing of a considerable part of the 
Polish elite. The start of the war then put everything on hold, including the 
agreed creation of a Ukrainian university.36  
The Galician compromise shows that the political and legal framework of 
Austria-Hungary facilitated peaceful solutions to the Polish-Ukrainian conflict 
through negotiations and compromise. The authorities tried to contain the 
violence between ethnic and religious groups, and there were procedures which 
regulated the response to violations of people’s rights. In an effort to protect the 
Jewish population from violence, the authorities intervened before the 
conditions for a pogrom could emerge. As already seen in the discussion of the 
Polish-Ukrainian conflict, Vienna could not always rely on the unconditional 
support of Polish-dominated local and regional authorities, and imperial 
intervention became crucial.  
In the Galician countryside, violence against Jews was propelled by a 
combination of modern racist anti-Semitism, economic grievances, commercial 
competition, the impact of modernisation and traditional religious (Christian) 
anti-Judaism. In Western Galicia, the wave of violence directed against Jews in 
1898 was only halted after the local authorities used violence and killed a 
number of rioters. Martial law was imposed across 33 districts, more than 1800 
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people were arrested, and 5,166 persons were accused of having committed 
crimes. 37 Sometimes attacks against Jews were predominantly fuelled by 
religious anti-Judaism. In some villages and towns near Jasło in the western, 
mostly Polish, part of Galicia, a tradition of holding so-called ‘Judasfeiern’38 
(Judas celebrations) developed. Every year, Christian (Polish) youths created a 
life-size puppet, dressing it in the traditional garb of Polish Jews. In the four days 
before Easter the puppet was carried through the streets; every few steps, it 
would be beaten with a stick while the crowd chanted ‘Hit the Jew’. After the 
procession, ‘the Jew’ would be taken to the top of the church tower and thrown 
down. Finally, the puppet would be brought to the river and thrown into the 
water while the crowd cheered. At one point, the local Jews finally had enough 
and contacted the Lemberg lawyer Marek Rappaport, who liaised with the 
Viennese branch of the Israelitische Allianz (Alliance Israélite), a Paris based 
international organisation which promoted Jewish education and fought anti-
Semitism. Rappaport complained that dignitaries and ‘intelligent’ people, 
including the mayor, the pharmacist and the doctor, participated in this carnival, 
and that even children were taking part. Rappaport wanted the organisers to be 
prosecuted, as these ‘Judasfeiern’ were helping to spread rumours about Jews 
committing ritual murders. Catholic priests and ‘all-Poles’ (Polish national 
democrats) continued to fuel the anti-Jewish sentiments of peasants and young 
people. Roman-Catholic priests declaimed Easter sermons which reminded 
Rappaport of the racist propaganda disseminated by the violently anti-Semitic 
Black Hundred organisation in Russia. He feared that such anti-Semitic speeches 
and events were creating an atmosphere in which violence against Jews would 
become probable. Rappaport also referred to an earlier incident which had 
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occurred in one of the towns which held ‘Judasfeiern’ to demonstrate how easily 
the local gentile population could fall for anti-Jewish rumours.39 
In March 1905, in Żmigród (Nowy) near Jasło, a town of some 2000 inhabitants 
(more than half of them Jewish), a rumour spread that a group of Jews had 
kidnapped a 14-year-old Christian girl with the intention of murdering her and 
using her blood for ritual purposes. The rumour fell on fertile ground. At the time 
Żmigród was full of villagers waiting to attend a series of church events. 40 The 
girl, Katharina Tabak, told the police that she had been kidnapped by a group of 
Jewish men while she was on her way from the house of her employer to church. 
She accused the seventy-year-old vinegar maker Josef Zimet and his fifty-year-
old son Sender of attempted rape, not of preparing a ritual murder. Fearing a 
pogrom, many Jews fled to larger towns. The police arrested Josef and Sender 
Zimet, their wives, and Josef’s unmarried daughter but released them after four 
days. This did not stop anti-Semitic newspapers from running the story and 
adding spurious salacious details – that the girl had been undressed, washed and 
locked in the cellar and that her clothes had been found buried in Jewish ground. 
The investigation, however, showed that the Jewish family was innocent. The girl 
had invented the story. On March 19th at 8 a.m. Katharina Tabak had told her 
employer, the peasant Jakob Bäl from Mytarz, that she would be going to church 
in Żmigród and would be back by noon. She only returned at 6 p.m. and without 
her shoes and shawl, which were later found in a nearby Christian cemetery. 
After a witness came forward, she admitted that she had been to another village 
to apply for a new job but insisted that she had been kidnapped. A local court 
found her guilty of perjury and sentenced her to three months in prison. Later, 
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an appeal court overturned the sentence and acquitted the girl due to ‘imbecility’ 
(Geistesschwäche). A pogrom had been averted, but even after the innocence of 
the five members of the Zimet family had been established, many villagers 
continued to believe the rumours of a planned ritual murder and continued to 
visit the ‘holy victim’.41  
While this example clearly shows that the legal order provided a means of 
fighting unjust accusations, Rappaport believed that the authorities needed to do 
more to protect the Jewish citizens. He also called on the Polish local notables to 
fight anti-Judaism as he was afraid that such events would eventually lead to 
bloodshed. During the ‘Judasfeiern,’ one Jew might lose his nerve and defend 
himself against the insults or one of the gentile peasants might become 
excessively agitated and this would lead to fights and casualties. Moreover, the 
‘Judasfeiern’ poisoned the relations between Poles and Jews. It should be the 
duty of teachers, intellectuals and the clergy to warn young people and stop this 
practice, but as this was not happening, Rappaport requested that the district 
captain or the governor disallow these ‘Judasfeiern’. The district captain of Jasło 
had imposed such a ban in 1912. When the ban was not renewed the following 
year, the ‘Judasfeiern’ became even more provocative. Clashes were only 
prevented by the judicious intervention of two or three prudent Jews.42 
These examples are typical in that they not only show the strong current of 
religious anti-Judaism in the region but also that grievances were heard and – at 
least sometimes – acted on. In 1898, 1905 and 1912, the local and regional 
authorities intervened to stop an event which incited religious hatred, but in 
1913 ‘Judasfeiern’ were once again being held. As the Polish-dominated local and 
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regional authorities did not act, the centre (Vienna) and the Ministry of the 
Interior got involved, with the Ministry of the Interior ordering the Galician 
governor in 1914 to ban ‘Judasfeiern’.43  
 
The erosion of the imperial order 
The First World War injected new violence into these conflicts, which, for 
decades, had mostly been resolved peacefully. But in East Galicia, violence did 
not start from below. There were no clashes between Poles and Ukrainians or 
examples of anti-Semitic violence at the beginning of the war. The major ethnic 
groups had rarely been so united. When the war broke out, the overwhelming 
majority of the inhabitants of Galicia were loyal to Austria-Hungary. Hundreds of 
thousands of Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish men fought alongside one another in 
the Austrian-Hungarian army.44 But despite the public expressions of loyalty 
displayed in both organised and spontaneous manifestations, the k. u. k. 
authorities did not trust all ethnic groups equally. Military units arriving from far 
afield mistook Ruthenians for Russians and overestimated the influence of the 
Russophile movement on the Ruthenian population.45  
In the summer of 1914 Austria-Hungary was in self-destruct mode. It not only 
started a war, risking the very existence of the empire, the civilian authorities 
also transferred extraordinary powers to the military, who did not sufficiently 
respect the principles of legality and the established procedures.46 In East Galicia 
the military authorities weakened the loyalty of the Ruthenian population by 
arresting and executing an unknown number of Ruthenians as Russophiles. Like 
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their Russian counterparts, the k. u. k. army was afraid of treason and feared 
attacks by its own citizens. While the Ottoman Empire targeted Armenians and 
the Russian authorities came down heavily on Russian Germans and Jews 
suspected of holding sympathies for the enemy, the Austrian-Hungarian military 
turned against Ruthenians and South Slavs in the multilingual southern 
provinces. The k. u. k. authorities themselves undermined the legal order they 
had been so keen to uphold and brought extra-legal violence to a region where 
previously they had done so much to keep the volatile Polish-Ukrainian conflict 
and outbreaks of anti-Semitism under control.47 
After two weeks of fighting, the Imperial and Royal Army was in full retreat and 
the authorities were looking for scapegoats. The Austrian military relied on 
information provided by local authorities. This did not bode well for Ruthenians, 
given that most civil servants in Galicia were ethnic Poles. Some of them used the 
opportunity to undermine the trust of the military in the Ruthenian population. 
The offices of the district captains and the gendarmerie provided lists of 
suspicious persons, who were then arrested. Rumours spread that Greek-
Catholic priests and peasants had used church towers to signal information 
about troop movements to the Russian Army. Individual cases were generalised 
into a pattern which shaped the perception of k. u. k. soldiers. Denunciations 
were a daily occurrence. Even Ukrainophiles took the opportunity to weaken the 
Russophile movement, but soon thereafter they themselves became the targets 
of denunciations. The campaign spiralled out of control. An unknown number of 
Ruthenians, possibly several thousand, were hanged or sentenced to death by 
military courts and summarily executed.48 The Galician newspapers were full of 
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reports about arrested ‘Moskalophile’ (Russophile) traitors. On August 13th, 
1918, for example, the newspaper Kurier Lwowski reported that 28 Ruthenian 
peasants from villages near Sokal had been sentenced to death and that 146 
‘Moskalophiles’, most of them peasants but also including one priest, had been 
transferred to the Brygidka prison in Lemberg.49  
The Brygidka prison was just a stopover on the way to the internment camps. 
One of the most notorious of these concentration camps was Camp Thalerhof 
near Graz, in the Austrian province of Styria. In November 1914, it already held 
5,700 internees from Galicia and the Bukovina. Living conditions were poor, 
inmates were mistreated, and several thousand internees did not survive their 
internment.50 After the war, the Ukrainian civic committee in Lemberg estimated 
that 25,000 Ukrainian civilians had been executed or otherwise perished in the 
prisons and camps. The true number is unknown, with estimates ranging from 
11,500 to 30,000.51 The violence directed against Ruthenians and South Slavs 
suspected of holding pro-Serbian sympathies52 is strikingly similar to the 
atrocities committed by the German Army against French and Belgian civilians in 
the summer of 1914. In all cases, the atrocities were motivated by anger about 
military setbacks, a search for scapegoats who could be blamed for the defeats, 
wild rumours, and a fear of ‘traitors’ or attacks by non-combatants. The main 
difference was that in East Galicia (as in the Russian and Ottoman Empire) the 
acts of violence by the military were directed against their own people, and the 
denunciations came from out of the midst of the population.53 
The executions and arrests undermined the belief that the authorities were 
impartial and rational actors. But Ruthenian hatred was not directed, in the first 
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instance, against the state and army, that is, against those who carried out the 
actual executions and arrests, but focused instead on Polish civil servants and 
Jews, who were held to be responsible for the denunciations. State violence was 
interpreted according to ethnic patterns of perception and resulted in animosity 
being directed against other ethnic groups. Imperial interests and the interests of 
Polish nationalists diverged. The Polish-dominated local and regional authorities 
contributed to the persecutions as they used the confusion during the war to 
weaken the Ukrainian national movement. Governor Witold Korytowski, for 
example, wrongly reported to Vienna that the Ukrainian movement did not have 
much influence in the general Ruthenian population and that Ruthenians tended 
to be pro-Russian.54 In July 1915, looking back on the first period of the war, the 
Austrian diplomat Leopold von Andrian blamed ‘the personal motives and above 
all the rancour of influential local Polish elements against the hated Ukrainians’ 
for the arrests and executions.55  
The loyalty of the population was tested further when the military defeats of the 
Austrian-Hungarian Army led to the occupation of East and parts of West Galicia 
by Russian troops. The period of transition between occupation regimes is 
always a time of uncertainty. The weakness or complete absence of state 
authority increases the probability of violent excesses and general lawlessness. It 
also shows whether the population expects to be punished for breaking the law 
and whether it expects the legitimate authorities to return. In Galicia the answer 
to both questions was no. Everywhere in the province, the time between the 
retreat of the k. u. k. army and the arrival of the Russian Army was used to rob, 
plunder, and settle accounts. People from all parts of society formed mobs and 
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robbed army and railway depots, empty flats and abandoned estates. In 
Lemberg, the three and a half days before the arrival of the Russian Army were 
‘true days of terror’.56 Ethnic or religious categories were not particularly 
important. While looters were reported to have said that the rule of Jews and 
Polish masters had now come to an end, they did not spare abandoned Ukrainian 
flats and houses either. Russian soldiers participated in or sometimes even 
instigated the attacks.57 After Russian military rule was firmly established, mob 
violence stopped, and the different ethnic groups had to settle in under Russian 
occupation. 
The Jewish population fared worst under Russian occupation. More than 
200,000 Jews from Galicia and the Bukovina (i.e., almost one quarter of the 
Jewish population) fled westwards, with many ending up in Vienna. Given the 
known loyalty of Jews to Austria, the Russian occupiers did not trust the Jewish 
population. Jews were discriminated against and subjected to appalling 
atrocities. There were murders, deportations, mass rapes and plundering. 
Cossack troops were the most notorious perpetrators, but they were often joined 
by gentiles who used the opportunity to rob Jews and seize their property.58 In 
some places, Russian military commanders imposed contributions on the local 
Jewish community. The Russian occupiers forced thousands of Jews to leave 
their homes and march eastwards. In Lemberg, a pogrom committed by Cossack 
troops on September 27th cost the lives of at least 38 Jews. The Russian military-
governor then prevented further pogroms from being carried out in such close 
proximity to his own headquarters, but the conquest of Przemyśl on 22 March 
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1915 was followed by attacks of Cossack troops on Jews and the expulsion of 
Jews from this Galician town.59  
The Russian occupiers played on local anti-Semitism to attract sympathy, but 
they did not succeed in winning the population over. This also applied to the 
majority of Ruthenians, many of whom would have had good reason to give up 
on Austria-Hungary. While a minority, the Russophile activists, welcomed the 
Russian troops as liberators, the much stronger Ukrainophile movement was 
vehemently anti-Russian. The Ukrainophiles were aware that all persons who 
identified as Ukrainians would lose out under Russian occupation, as the Russian 
government refused to acknowledge the existence of a Ukrainian nation and 
considered Ukrainian to be a Russian dialect and Ruthenians/Ukrainians 
(referred to a Little Russians) a branch of the Russian nation. The annexation of 
East Galicia was one of the major Russian war aims and was intended as the first 
step in the ‘little-Russification’ of the Ukrainian-speaking population. Already 
during the Russian occupation, the Ukrainian national movement was 
suppressed, its institutions closed, Ukrainian-language publications forbidden, 
and severe pressure was placed on the Greek-Catholic Church.60 
Under Russian occupation, the majority of Galicians, irrespective of religion, 
class, or ethnicity, remained loyal to the Habsburg emperor, but the 
fragmentation of Galician society along ethnic, religious and national fault lines 
continued. Even though the Jewish population clearly suffered most, many 
Ukrainians and Poles viewed them as war profiteers. They accused Jewish 
traders of having ‘done business’ with the occupiers. The Austrian Major General 
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Franz Riml later wrote that under Russian occupation anti-Semitism had reached 
a ‘level previously unknown’.61 
When Austrian troops returned to Lemberg on June 22nd, 1915 and 
subsequently liberated most of East Galicia, the population cheered the 
soldiers.62 The celebrations, however, did not last long. The initial defeat and the 
atrocities committed against Ruthenians had weakened the legitimacy of 
imperial rule, and Russian occupation had increased ethnic tensions. After all, 
the imperial army had not been able to protect the region, and the longer the war 
continued, the clearer it became that the empire was also incapable of feeding its 
population. The inhabitants of towns and cities in particular started to suffer 
from hunger. The state passed on the responsibility of feeding local populations 
to the respective local authorities, but they too struggled to meet demand. 
Welfare organisations – often organised along ethnic, social or religious lines – 
stepped in.63 Most public kitchens in Lemberg were run by the municipality, but 
there were also some which served only one religious or ethnic group. Jewish, 
Ukrainian and Polish aid organisations operated independently from one 
another, which further encouraged the fragmentation of urban society along 
ethno-religious lines.64 
Democratic and participatory structures eroded during the war. The Austrian 
government did not return the region to civilian administration but appointed a 
military governor instead, who was not a member of the Polish elite but an 
Austrian-German general. Self-government in Lemberg was also suspended, but 
the city administration continued to operate under a government commissar 
who was advised by a council of state-appointed ‘trusted men’, many of them 
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previous councillors. Later on, the governor approved the constitution of a 
provisional council consisting of the old elected councillors but complemented 
by newly appointed or co-opted councillors, including, for the first time, several 
representatives of the Ukrainian population.65 
Aided by a spate of denunciations from all ranks of society, the k. u. k. 
government prosecuted real or imagined collaborators. Persons who had 
collaborated politically or had committed crimes against the life or property of 
fellow citizens were arrested. A series of trials against collaborators and 
informers, looters and robbers were launched. More Poles and Ukrainians were 
affected by these measures than Jews, who had had no incentive to collaborate.66 
In July 1918 the last Austrian governor, Count Karl von Huyn, criticised the 
policies implemented after the recapture of East Galicia. The patriotic 
enthusiasm of the population had cooled considerably following the sanctions 
meted out to suspected collaborators. 67  The author of an anonymous 
memorandum for the Austrian government went even further. The unjustified 
arrests had undermined the loyalty of the Polish population. ‘In those circles 
which support Austria it is said with bitter sarcasm: the military administration 
should be awarded medals by the Russians, for it competently managed to 
alienate the inhabitants of Lemberg from Austria.’68 
Extra-legal violence against civilians by the Austrian-Hungarian and Russian 
military contributed to the deterioration of ethnic relations and the atmosphere 
of mutual distrust. After their return the Austrian-Hungarian authorities 
managed to keep ethnic conflicts under control but political and military 
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blunders, and the inability to provide sufficient food for the population 
undermined the legitimacy of imperial rule.  
 
National self-determination  
Changes to the international context, in particular the two Russian revolutions of 
1917 and the ‘Wilsonian moment,’ further weakened the attraction of the 
imperial framework and induced Polish nationalists to sever ties with Austria-
Hungary and Germany and go for full independence instead. The February 
Revolution in Russia was a pivotal moment for both the Ukrainian and the Polish 
national movements. The new provisional Russian government had accepted 
that Poland would become an independent state, while the Central Powers 
hesitated to guarantee full independence. For Polish politicians, the February 
Revolution in Russia reduced the attraction of the Austro-Polish option, while 
Galician Ukrainians, and even more so the Jewish population, were still firmly on 
the side of Austria-Hungary despite the promising developments in Russian 
Ukraine where a Ukrainian proto-government (the Central Rada) had been 
formed.69  
The October Revolution made the change irreversible: Poland would become 
independent. It was not U.S. President Wilson but the Bolshevik leader Vladimir 
I. Lenin who paved the way to independence for national movements all over 
Eastern Europe. In the Decree on Peace, which was passed on November 8th, 
1917, the new Soviet Russian government proclaimed that peace should be 
based on the principle of national self-determination for all nationalities, 
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including colonies. This went much further than anything Britain, France or the 
USA had been prepared to propose. The unilateral decision by the Soviet Russian 
government to end the war meant that the Western Allies now faced no 
constraints on their policy towards Poland. With Russia under Bolshevik control 
and newly out of the war, Polish independence became an official part of the 
Allied war aims. In January 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson stated in his 
famous Fourteen Points that Poland would become an independent state with 
access to the sea. The logical consequence of this was that Germany and Austria-
Hungary would have to surrender territory to the new Polish state. From this 
point on, a victory by the Entente was very much in the interest of Polish state-
building, as a defeat of the Central Powers would provide an opportunity to 
include both the Austrian and the Prussian partitions in the new Polish state. As 
a result, the Polish population increasingly tended to favour the Entente.  
The final blow came with the bungled peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. The 
Central Powers agreed with the new Ukrainian People’s Republic that the Chełm 
region, which had been part of Russian Poland, would belong to Ukraine. This led 
to fierce protests by the Polish population, while Ukrainians celebrated the fact 
that the Central Powers had recognised the existence of a Ukrainian state. 
Austria-Hungary had also secretly promised the Ukrainian government that 
Galicia would be divided, and that a Ukrainian crownland would be created. The 
secret did not remain a secret for very long and fuelled Polish protests even 
further. When the Austrian government retracted its promise, it managed to 
offend the Ukrainians while failing to win back the Polish population. The 
deteriorating living conditions and the political grievances coalesced. Polish 
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nationalists destroyed German and Austrian state symbols and tore down 
pictures of the emperors Wilhelm and Karl (who had succeeded Franz Joseph in 
late 1916). Politicians, teachers, members of the clergy, and – most worryingly – 
many civil servants openly rescinded their loyalty to Austria-Hungary and called 
for the creation of an independent Polish state.70 It was not – as Judson rightly 
states – the ‘existence of national movements and nationalist conflicts in Austro-
Hungarian politics’ as such which caused the downfall of the empire,71 but it 
significantly reduced the chances of the empire to survive a military defeat. 
Moreover, the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution and of the ‘Wilsonian moment’ 
can hardly be overstated as they opened the door to full independence, at least 
for some of the empire’s nations. ‘Pandora’s Box’ – as Robert Gerwarth called it – 
had been opened, and nationalist loyalties started to trump imperial loyalties.72 
For Ukrainian nationalists, however, Wilson’s Fourteen Points were much less 
attractive than they were for the Polish national movement. In point 10, Wilson 
had stated that the people of Austria-Hungary should be accorded the 
opportunity for autonomous development, but this announcement was too 
vague to persuade Ukrainian politicians to switch loyalties. In all Ukrainian 
territories, the power resided with Austria-Hungary and Germany. The weakness 
of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, which depended on German and Austrian-
Hungarian military support, was one of the reasons why Galician Ukrainians 
were reluctant to push for full independence. Ukrainian politicians in Galicia 
continued to be loyal, even after the promise to divide the crownland was broken 
and the Chełm region was removed from Ukraine. German and Austrian-
Hungarian armies continued to occupy the whole region and installed Hetman 
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Pavlo Skoropads’kyj, a more accommodating leader than the politicians of the 
Central Rada.73 No help for the state-building efforts of Ukrainians in Austria-
Hungary would therefore be forthcoming from the Ukrainian People’s Republic. 
To contain Polish dominance, the Galician Ukrainians depended on Austrian 
support. Their best hope was still a Ukrainian crownland with far-reaching 
autonomy. Even in October 1918, the majority of Ukrainian politicians were not 
demanding a complete break with Austria-Hungary. The only exception was the 
small social-democratic party which demanded immediate unification with the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic.74 The Ukrainian daily Dilo wrote that under no 
circumstances should East Galicia be part of a Polish state.75 For Ukrainian 
nationalists, self-determination did not mean breaking away from the empire but 
ending Polish dominance in the region.76 
By 1918, anti-Semitism was on the rise again and the Polish-Ukrainian conflict 
intensified. Especially in West Galicia attacks on Jews increased. Stories about 
ritual murders and other anti-Semitic tropes spread, Jews were accused of 
shirking and profiteering from the war.77 The Jewish population remained the 
most loyal to the empire and remained loyal until the very end. This fuelled the 
anti-Semitism in Polish society, where national aspirations stood to benefit most 
from an Entente victory. The imperial authorities still tried to contain anti-
Semitic violence and prevent pogroms. When anti-Semitic leaflets demanding the 
‘dejudaization of Poland’ were distributed in Lemberg in February 1918, the 
police hunted down the culprit, a Polish Catholic priest from Lublin province.78 
On October 10th, 1918, the Ukrainian daily Dilo published an article commenting 
on the intention of the Polish Regency Council in Warsaw to create an 
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independent Polish state. The Poles and their leaders, the newspaper wrote, 
needed to know that they would have to choose between war and peace. If they 
wanted to claim East Galicia for a future Polish state, there would be a war with 
the Ukrainians. If they accepted minority status in a Ukrainian state where they 
would enjoy all minority rights, there would be peace.79 The warning was 
ignored. When the collapse of Austria-Hungary could no longer be averted, 
Polish and Ukrainian politicians prepared to seize power in East Galicia. 
Governor General Karl Huyn refused to transfer power to either side without 
receiving authorisation from Vienna80 but Polish politicians were sure that there 
was no alternative to the region becoming part of the Polish state. A delegation of 
the Polish Liquidation Committee was expected to arrive in Lemberg from 
Cracow on November 1st to claim the city and region for Poland. As the 
crownland’s administration was dominated by Poles, a smooth transfer of power 
seemed to be assured. To pre-empt this proclamation, the Ukrainian National 
Committee proclaimed a Ukrainian state, the Western Ukrainian People’s 
Republic with Lemberg as its capital. In the night to November 1st, Ukrainian 
soldiers of the Austrian-Hungarian Army, now acting on behalf of the Western 
Ukrainian government, took control of the city. In response, the secret Polish 
military organisations called on the Polish population to resist. A few thousand 
men and women, adolescents and children responded to the call.81 
The Ukrainian politicians tried to legitimize their power grab. As Huyn refused to 
pass his authority on to the Western Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian 
leaders, many of them lawyers, found a way out. Huyn declared himself 
incapable of exercising power any longer and transferred his authority to his 
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Ukrainian deputy who passed it on to the Western Ukrainian government.82 This 
again shows the strength of a political culture strongly rooted in legal procedure. 
But the Polish majority in the city had no intention of accepting this fait 
accompli. Secret Polish military organisations organised armed resistance. For 
more than three weeks, troops of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic 
battled Polish volunteers for the control of Lemberg. The Kahal (a local body of 
Jewish self-administration) formed a militia to protect the Jewish quarter. It 
declared itself to be strictly neutral in this conflict, which was sliding into civil 
war and – after the proclamation of the Second Polish Republic on November 
11th, 1918 – metamorphosed into a war between Poland and the Western 
Ukrainian People’s Republic.83 
The Russian October Revolution followed by the commitment of Britain, France 
and USA to restore an independent Polish state with access to the Baltic Sea all 
but ended the chances of the Central Powers to win Polish support. In Austria-
Hungary, the Polish population was no longer satisfied with anything short of full 
independence for a Polish state consisting of territory from all three partitions. 
The threat of a perpetuation of Polish dominance in East Galicia and the 
weakness of the Ukrainian People’s Republic made the Galician Ukrainians still 
look for Austrian-Hungarian support to counteract Polish national aspirations, 
while an increase in anti-Semitic violence especially in West Galicia made the 
Jewish population  weary of what a post-imperial future might bring.  
The brutalisation of ethnic conflicts and the question of legitimacy 
The Polish-Ukrainian war started slowly, as if both sides still had hopes that a 
compromise might be found, as had so often been the case in the previous 50 
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years under the aegis of Austria-Hungary. Old habits did not die quickly. Many 
attempts were made by moderate Ukrainian and Polish politicians to come to a 
negotiated solution, but the Polish military commanders refused to accept any 
compromise. In the end, the outcome was decided by military might. In the first 
few weeks of the conflict, Ukrainian and Polish soldiers were still able to 
interrupt their fighting and enjoy a cigarette together, but the fighting soon 
became more brutal.84 This set off a downward spiral of violence, leading to 
atrocities. Both Ukrainian and Polish troops appear to have committed war 
crimes.85 After three weeks of street fighting and the arrival of fresh troops, the 
Poles managed to oust the Ukrainian soldiers from the city on November 22nd, 
1918. The Ukrainian Galician Army laid siege to Lemberg and continued fighting, 
but after a few more months and following the arrival of experienced Polish 
units from the Western front (the so-called Haller Army) the war ended in July 
1919 with a Polish victory.86 
After fighting in the city had ended on November 22nd, 1918, Polish troops 
disarmed the Jewish militia and – three weeks after the end of Austrian-
Hungarian rule in the region – a three-day pogrom began. The Polish military 
newspaper accused the Jewish militia of having supported the Ukrainian side. 
This prompted Polish soldiers to attack the Jewish quarter after its militia had 
surrendered its weapons. During this period of confusion, soldiers told their 
victims that their military commanders had allowed them to punish Jews for 
their behaviour during the three weeks of street fighting. Revenge was not the 
only motive. Greed was equally important. The pogrom was accompanied by 
arson, robbery, looting, and blackmail.87 The main perpetrators of the violence 
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were Polish fighters, sometimes accompanied by civilians.88 The pogrom ended 
after Polish commanders managed to re-establish public order, but individual 
attacks and anti-Semitic discrimination continued for several months. The new 
Polish government under head of state Marshall Józef Pilsudski and Prime 
Minister Ignacy Paderewski denied that anti-Semitism was a problem, blaming 
any excesses on the Jewish population’s lack of loyalty to Poland.89 There were 
more incidents of anti-Jewish violence in West Galicia, with yet more atrocities 
committed by Polish troops and the troops of its ally, the leader of the 
directorate of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Symon Petljura, during the 
Polish-Soviet war of 1920.90 
After the defeat of the Central Powers, Ukrainian politicians had pinned their 
hopes on the victorious powers. Now the right of self-determination and 
Wilson’s different statements became important points of reference. Dilo 
reminded its readers that Wilson had only acknowledged the Polish right of self-
determination for Polish territories to which, in its view, East Galicia and other 
regions with a Ukrainian majority did not belong.91 In numerous memoranda to 
the peace-makers, the Western Ukrainian government argued against Polish 
claims and called in vain for Allied support for an independent Western 
Ukrainian state. But on November 21st, 1919 the High Council of the Paris Peace 
Conference acknowledged the facts on the ground by placing East Galicia under 
Polish administration for a period of 25 years. 
Previously blurred boundaries had now become sharply delineated. The Polish-
Ukrainian war forced people to choose sides and pick their nation. The Jewish 
population was caught between a rock and a hard place. Jewish neutrality during 
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the Polish-Ukrainian conflict was interpreted by Polish society as a betrayal of 
Poland and had not won any Ukrainian sympathies either. The number of 
religious conversions increased dramatically after the war. Where national 
affiliation and religion or denomination appeared to be in conflict, people 
converted to the religion or denomination that indicated their national 
affiliation. In the six years before 1918, between 194 and 317 people in 
Lemberg/Lwów/L’viv converted annually to Roman Catholicism. In 1919, the 
number rose to 2,239 (out of a total of 2329 conversions) and the number of 
conversions stayed high in the three years that followed (865, 761, 645, 
respectively). In 1919, 2089 Greek Catholics and 130 Jews changed their 
religious affiliation. Almost all of them converted to Roman Catholicism to bring 
their denomination/religion in line with their national identification.92 
As Judson rightly states when referring to the successor states of Austria-
Hungary, there was a strong continuity of institutions between the empire and 
the new nation states or ‘little empires’, as he calls them, due to most of them 
having substantial national minorities.93  There were also strong personal 
continuities. Even after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, the population saw 
the same politicians standing in elections, the same civil servants approving 
planning applications, the same policemen patrolling the streets, the same judges 
sitting in court applying the same law codes. In East Galicia, however, things 
were somewhat different. It is true that most of the officials who worked for the 
local authorities did not change, but some disappeared. Crucially, those who 
disappeared were Ukrainian civil servants, judges and officials who resigned or 
were forced to leave their jobs after they refused to swear an oath of allegiance 
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to the new Polish state. While Ukrainian nationalists and the Ukrainian 
population had accepted the imperial framework and its legal order, they did not 
recognise the legitimacy of the new Polish authority or the right of its 
representatives to rule over East Galicia. The political leaders of the Ukrainian 
population called for a boycott of the Polish census in 1921 and asked Ukrainians 
not to participate in the Polish elections in 1922 so as not to give the impression 
of legitimising Polish rule over this ethnographically Ukrainian territory. For the 
majority of Ukrainian politicians and for the Ukrainian population, the boycott 
ended on March 14th, 1923 when the Council of Ambassadors (from Italy, 
France, Britain and Japan) at the League of Nations, ignoring all Ukrainian 
protestations and memoranda, decided that East Galicia would be incorporated 
into Poland, with the expectation that the region would be given far-reaching 
autonomy. The Polish government was forced to sign a minority treaty 
guaranteeing the rights of Jewish, Ukrainian, Belarusian and German 
minorities.94 
The Entente, however, failed to hold the Polish government accountable. The 
League of Nations was meant to monitor whether Poland was meeting its 
obligations, but in fact this depended on the good will of the Polish government. 
The key promise, i.e. a promise to create an autonomous Ukrainian region in East 
Galicia, was never kept and Ukrainians suffered discrimination, with Ukrainian 
civil servants not permitted to return to the civil service. This radicalised the 
Ukrainian national movement and led to the formation of the Ukrainian Military 
Organisation (later replaced by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists), 
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which carried out terrorist attacks targeting Polish politicians and officials and 
moderate Ukrainian politicians.95  
It is not an overstatement to say that the Second Polish Republic never managed 
to fully integrate its Ukrainian minority. While the Galician Ukrainians had 
accepted the imperial Austrian-Hungarian framework, even moderate Ukrainian 
politicians operating within the Polish national framework did so with strong 
reservations. Although their main focus was on improving the rights and living 
conditions of their fellow Ukrainian nationals, they never gave up hope that the 
affiliation with Poland would be only temporary and would be followed by an 
independent Ukrainian nation state. 
 
Conclusion 
In the decades before the Great War Austria-Hungary had managed to contain 
the Polish-Ukrainian conflict and limit anti-Semitic violence. The imperial 
framework had been transformed and provided mechanisms which encouraged 
compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Imperial and national 
loyalties were mostly compatible but diverging interests clashed, for example 
when the Polish dominated regional authorities favoured Russophile candidates 
against Ukrainophile candidats in elections 
The empire managed to balance conflicting national interests as long as full 
national independence was not on the cards. In Galicia, as elsewhere in Europe, 
hopes were high that the war would not last long and would end with the 
comprehensive victory of their own side. Polish and Ukrainian politicians 
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expected that their loyalty would be rewarded. The problem was that their 
expectations contradicted each other. Defeat prevented Austria-Hungary’s ability 
to negotiate compromises from being put to the ultimate test.  
Imperial authority had already begun to erode early on in the war, and the 
principle of the rule of law was undermined by the introduction of military rule 
and the mass arrest and execution of Ruthenians. Under Russian occupation, the 
civil population, especially the Jews, became the victims of violence, oppression, 
arrests and deportations. It was, however, not war and military setbacks alone 
which caused the collapse of the empire. Political mistakes and the failure of the 
Austrian government to feed its populations contributed to its fall. And finally, it 
was the ‘defection’ of the Polish population which ended Austrian rule in East 
Galicia. The majority of the Jewish population remained loyal until the very end, 
and Ukrainians also continued to make plans with Austria very much in the 
picture.  
There was a ‘Wilsonian moment’ in Galicia, but the two Russian revolutions were 
even more important. The February Revolution brought a new dynamic to the 
Polish question, with the acceptance by the Provisional Government that there 
would be an independent Polish state after the war. The right of national self-
determination referred to in the Decree on Peace by the Soviet Russian 
government on November 8th, 1917 and then by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson 
in his Fourteen Points speech on January 8th, 1918 gave legitimacy to the claims 
of nationalists, with severe consequences for the fragile truce in multi-ethnic 
East Galicia. The October Revolution and the end of Russian participation in the 
First World War allowed Britain, France and the USA to play the Polish card 
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without having to take account of Russian interests. Thereafter, Polish 
nationalists refused to be satisfied with anything short of full independence and 
a Polish state which encompassed territories taken from all three partitions. This 
could only be achieved by an Entente victory. The Ukrainian movement in 
Galicia, on the other hand, could also refer to the right of national self-
determination but was aware of what Poland had been promised. The best 
chance of achieving a united Ukraine was still linked to a victory of the Central 
Powers. It was only after Austria-Hungary had collapsed that Western Ukrainian 
politicians began placing their hopes in Wilson and the Entente. 
In multi-ethnic East Galicia there was no peaceful transition of power from the 
empire to a new state. Instead, the demise of Austria-Hungary led to the collapse 
of public order and chaotic violence. It started in West Galicia with an increase of 
the number of attacks against the Jewish population. Greed, together with stories 
of ritual murders, of Jews profiting from the war and of not supporting the Polish 
nation led to anti-Semitic violence. In East Galicia the main reason for ethnic 
violence was the existence of two mutually exclusive state-building projects. The 
Polish minority in East Galicia denied the legitimacy of the newly proclaimed 
Western Ukrainian People’s Republic, while the Ukrainian majority refused to 
recognise the integration of the region into the new Polish state. This led to the 
Polish-Ukrainian war and contributed to anti-Semitic excesses. Although the new 
Polish authorities were interested in maintaining law and order, they were not 
impartial arbiters and placed the interests of the Polish nation and state above 
all else. The Ukrainian population never felt the same degree of loyalty towards 
Poland as they had towards Austria-Hungary. The Entente, and later the League 
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of Nations, were incapable of providing the political framework for a negotiated 
solution of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict as, unlike Austria-Hungary, they lacked 
both the ability and the will to enforce it. The Ukrainian question in Poland was 
still unsolved when the Second World War began. 
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